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GENTLE INTO THAT GOOD NIGHT: SUBSIDY EXPIRATION
PROVIDES A LESSON IN REFORM THROUGH INACTIONS
Max Bulinski*
After thirty years, Congress let the federal subsidy for cornbased ethanol expire on December 31, 2011.1 Although the
influence of “Big Corn” is not as ubiquitously known as that of
“Big Oil” or pharmaceuticals, the agricultural sector is consistently
ranked among the top sectors for lobbying expenditures. 2 This
political clout is well demonstrated by the extent of the former
subsidy. The ethanol subsidy has been in existence for the last
thirty years and cost taxpayers roughly six billion dollars in each
recent year. 3
It is unclear what prompted the end of the subsidy. Public
opinion may have played a key role. The Tea Party opposed the
subsidy on fiscally conservative grounds. 4 Environmentalists have
long opposed the subsidy. But until recently, the subsidy had been
renewed continuously.
The political landscape has shifted significantly since then,
and the subsidy of ethanol has fallen out of favor with many
political candidates. When Tim Pawlenty declared his candidacy
for the GOP nomination in Iowa, he did so in Iowa while opposing
the corn subsidy, voicing his concern that government subsidy
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were fundamentally inconsistent with promoting competitive
innovation in the industry. 5 Evidently, Pawlenty’s campaign
thought enough of the voting public shared this opinion that the
view would not be political suicide (although support for Pawlenty
has dwindled and he is no longer running, this author attributes
the decline to factors other than opposition to the corn ethanol
subsidy). Opposition to the subsidy by a mainstream candidate for
president marks a considerable change from the 2008 presidential
election, where no major candidates opposed the subsidy.
But the subsidy did not end (at least not directly) because any
particular political figure took a stand to eliminate it. After all the
protests, lobbying, and meetings on Capitol Hill, Congress
declined to extend the ethanol subsidy, which the New York
Times states had become a “symbol of corporate welfare.” 6
To some observers, the expiration of the subsidy may seem
functionally equivalent to Congress eliminating the funding.
Letting the bill expire sends a message that it would be
unfavorable to support an extension of the policy. It is a simple
process of not doing anything (many would say this might be
what Congress does best) and waiting for the days to pass until the
term of the subsidy ends.
Voting to get rid of the policy signals an active disapproval of
the program when weighed against competing priorities. 7
Repealing the subsidy would have taken political capital, but
would have saved money in the national treasury. Because saving
tax dollars is a large motivation for cutting the subsidy in the first
place, it might seem beneficial to cut the program as soon as
public opinion was squarely behind removing it. Tim Pawlenty’s
speech in late May in Ohio serves as a rough estimate for when
public opinion had turned against the ethanol subsidy: a
presidential candidate who promises to remove the subsidy in a
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state whose agriculture is heavily corn-based, meeting minimal
objections, might conclude the public is on his side. Ending the
subsidy in June, rather than in December, would have saved
taxpayers approximately $3 billion. 8
While that is only a drop in the national deficit bucket, it
would be a start.
However, Congress rarely works as quickly as the public
might like. Since the subsidy was close to expiration, maybe even
those members of Congress who were truly opposed to the subsidy
did not think the battle to repeal it was worth waging. Perhaps
they left the subsidy out of deference to those who had enacted it.
Whatever the reason, Congress took a passive role in the
resolution of an issue that some congressional representatives
recently have opposed actively.
It may not even be the case that the views of the American
people have changed much with regard to subsidizing ethanol. In
the current financial climate, much of the American constituency
is worried about the economy. While the ethanol subsidy may
have seemed a harmless or even beneficial expenditure last time
it was passed, the fact that Congress let it expire may not signal a
radical change in the perceived benefits of the program, but
instead an increased awareness of budget problems and a
movement toward a more conservative fiscal stance of voters. 9
While the signal of disapproval for the subsidy could clearly
have been stronger, the expiration of the subsidy for ethanol may
be a response to the will of a large portion of the American
public. In an era where the public is concerned about corporate
control of the political process, this may be a good sign that shifts
in priorities of the public still carry weight.
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